Nor, says Eric, is it the cudgel by which Microsoft will bludgeon hapless users into submission, eliminating leeway and extirpating uncontrolled distribution. Eric provocatively asserts that En-Scub (it does sound Lovecraftian, doesn’t it? Plus, it’s not even a proper acronym. I’ll refrain from any further characterizations of Microsoft at this point) can ensure that piracy continues unchecked. He points out that the technology behind En-Scub is purpose-neutral (as nearly neutral as any technology can be).
Sound enough claims, up to a point. The aspects of En-Scub that most bother me aren’t the “intrinsic evil” aspects (or the dysacronymy or the monstrous sound of the thing). I have different grave objections. To wit:
(1) A structured system for securing trusted networks depends on my willingness to trust the system’s vendor. I won’t troll or flame, but simply observe that reasonable minds may find data in the public record to suggest that Microsoft might not constitute a perfectly reliable vendor for such a system.
(2) Does the idea of Microsoft designing a required hardware element to go along with their now-all-but-mandatory operating system strike anyone else as problematic? Will En-Scub be designed in the open, so that Linux and Mac users aren’t excluded from the outset?
(3) It looks as though this doesn’t amount to digital identity management so much as hardware authorization. That’s an important distinction. If I’m travelling and want to use my friend Melissa’s computer to do some digital errands, will Melissa’s computer automatically accommodate my authorizations? If so, what kind of protections and restrictions are we talking about? If not, it sounds as though I’ll only be able to interoperate with the En-Scub universe so long as I’m using my own personal machine. (What if my computer goes wonky? Assuming I have all my files backed up, I can edit them on a loaner machine — except that the loaner may not know what all my different authorizations are. What happens when I sell my old computer? There may be answers to all these — in fact I’m sure there are such answers, although they may not appease me — but the point of DigID should be that AKMA can do AKMA-stuff freely whatever computer he’s using, wherever he may be.
Plus, I wouldn’t trust Uncle Bill with my pocket lint. Whoops! Sorry.
Posted by AKMA at May 19, 2003 10:09 PM | TrackBackTo me it sounds like one of the mysterious Sumerian brainstem programs from Snow Crash.
Posted by: Kevin Marks at May 20, 2003 01:09 AMPersonally, I think that the point of ANY DigID system should be to PREVENT AKMA (or any of his minions) from doing any AKMA-stuff.
Then the world will be a better place....
i'm with David on this one. AKMA is just downright dangerous...even in small doses.
Posted by: eric norlin at May 20, 2003 08:52 AMIt's actually NGSCB, next-generation secure computing base. There's a pretty good FAQ at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/tcpa-faq.html.
yes, i'm rebelling about calling it "ing-scub" (which some internal msft folks do), preferring "en-scub" (the pronounciation of NGSCB -- of course taking into account the hyphen between the N and G)....
Posted by: eric norlin at May 21, 2003 12:51 PMWhat about “En Gus Cub,” or “Angus Cub”? (“Angus” makes it sound as though the security system might be susceptible to bovine spongiform encephalopathy — that is, its brain might be riddled with holes. . . .
Posted by: AKMA at May 21, 2003 05:24 PM