I feel as though I ought to respond to Chris‘s lovely, generous response — especially since Dave has noticed. This blogging thing — it may just catch on after all…
I answered Chris with first attention to something that wasn’t even his main point. That’s an initial sign of his grace as a conversation partner; many people would just have harrumphed and castigated me for missing the point, as the beginning of my reply admittedly indicated that I might have done. I think I needed to clear that ground before I began to scaffold a more pertinent response, but I didn’t frame my post that way. Thanks for your patience, Chris.
Eventually I drew near to Chris’s sensible, intriguing suggestion that ‘religion’ may helpfully treated as a ‘container’ (in the sense of ‘a bounded space of shared identity and meaning-making’). I was answering Chris from within the container, as it were, while he was contemplating ‘religion’ as if from looking at the container. I forbear to say ‘from outside’, since (a) Chris is too subtle to suppose he escapes being containerised, and (b) he himself participates in practices internal to the container, though he and I might (given world enough, and time) less coyly sit down, and think which way we walk, and pass our short lives’ day in articulating, assessing, acknowledging, rejoicing in, and in some cases discovering the insignificance of our differences.
There’s an irony, too, in my having begun my response from the position that I hold various doctrinal claims to be ‘true’, inasmuch as I’ve repeated far too often my axiom ‘A theory of truth is one theory too many’ (a misrepresentation of what Freud attributed to Charcot: ‘Theory is good, but that doesn’t prevent things from existing’ in Complete Works volume 3, p. 13). I say that — heuristically, not metaphysically — because we demonstrate what we take to be true by how we live more than by what abstractions we affirm. But again, Chris didn’t take any cheap tu quoque shots on this point, bless him. I do affirm, unhesitatingly, that the ordinary repertoire of Christian beliefs are true, though I enact that faith very imperfectly, and though in the analytical sense I don’t profess to know just how they are true.
Now by way of direct response, when Chris says ‘he isn’t necessarily interested in my framing and exploration of religion-as-container, but instead in sharing the way in which his participation in his religion guides his participation in civic life’ I should have made clear that I am interested in his framing, and I take it to be a useful dialogical gesture, so long as no one takes the gesture of containerisation to capture what ‘religion’ is really all about, and doubly so when that ‘really’ departs from what the religion’s adherents would say about themselves. No, adherents don’t have some privileged status for describing truly the nature of their way, but discussion of ‘religion’ loses some degree of usefulness when it loses touch with what the adherents might say about themselves.
That ‘degree of usefulness’ may not be worth worrying about in some circumstances. Let’s say, strictly hypothetically, that a ‘religion’ devised as a tax dodge that in turn grew beyond its initial function and became an international mind control syndicate — the dangers of corruption in civic life would warrant talking about the ‘religion’ in terms that adherents might not affirm, and we would all have to deal with the fallout. My attitude toward truth-claims isn’t negative across the board; I just don’t thinnk we often gain clarity about a problem by arriving at a crystalline abstract definition of truth. Or religion — which may be just what Chris was talking about in the first place, which makes this a great place for me to just stop talking: Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen (‘Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent’, Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Ogden trans., p. 188/189).